




Legislative enactment and judicial exposition have both com-
bined, of late years, to give the law of liens increased importance.
By the former, its remedies have been much extended; by the lat-
ter, its provisions have received a more liberal construction. It
has, of c9urse, undergone many changes, so that some observations
upon it may not be unacceptable.'
Liens are primarily divided into general and specific: the lattter
are favored by the Courts; the former are regarded vith jealousy.2
A specific lien is one given by law, by custom or by statute, and
attaches only to specific property for the unpaid price, carriage
thereof, work and labor done, materials furnished, or the like.3  A
general lien is the right to detain goods, not only for charges due
I The space allotted to the present remarks does not permit an extended exami-
nation of this subject. Much of the obscurity and confusion which prevails in
regard to it might be cleared up by a careful review of the cases and statutes in
which the word is sometimes used in a technical, sometimes in a popular sense.
The loose manner of using the word, and the confusion attendant thereon, are well
noticed by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, Green vs. Briggs, 6 Hare 400.
2 4 Carr & Payne, 152, Bleadon vs. Hancock, 7 East 224.
3 3 Hill 491; Grinnell vs. Cook, 2 Watts & Serg. 395.
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upon the articles themselves, but for a general balance of accounts
relating to other transactions of the same character. It is given
only by usage, which must be proved by numerous and ancient
instances, by an express agreement between the parties, (when it
partakes of the nature of a pawn or pledge,) or by a continuous
mode of dealing with such an understanding-and in the absence
of clear evidence to establish the general lien, the claim will be
restricted to the specific lien, if any, existing in the case1
Liens are further divided into, 1. at Common law: 2. in Equity:
3. in Admiralty: 4. by Statute; with their several incidents. The
last division would seem, in most of its details, to be properly in-
cluded under the first three: nevertheless, the principles, which
have been applied to the exposition of this class of statutes, are
sufficiently numerous and important, to make it desirable to collect
them under a distinctive head.
Lien at common law is a qualified right, to constitute which there
must be, 1. possession of the property by the claimant; 2. title to
it in another; 3. an unsatisfied claim or demand upon it by the
possessor.2  Whether charges, not incurred by the owner or his
authorized agent, but by some one claiming, thougi tortuously, to
be the rightful owner, will give a lien-is a question, the discussion
of which will be waived for the present.3 Possession by -the lien-
man is an incident, peculiar to this class of liens ;' and is owing to
the principles in which the doctrine of liens had its origin, viz:
that a party, who was compelled to receive the goods of another,
should be entitled to retain them for his indemnity.5 But, in
Equity, a creditor may obtain rights over property Or securities,
neither actually in his possession, nor vested in him, for the purpose
'6 East. 519; Rushfortb v8. Hadfield, 7 East. 224, McIntyre vs. Carver, 2 W. &
S. 395. 6 Term 14, Kirkman vs. Shaweross.
2 6 East. 27, note, Lickbarrow v8. Mason; 2 Watts & Sergeant 895, McIntyre vs.
Carver, 18 Q. B. 680, (66 E. C. L.) Forth vs. Simpson.
3 Ld. Ray 867 ; Yorke vs. Greenaugh.
42-Story R. 143, Exparte John S. Foster; 1 Peters 886, 441, 442, Conard vs.
Atlantic Insurance Co.; 2 Watts & S. 895, McIntyre vs. Carver.
5 Lord Ray. 852; Skinner v8. Upshaw, Lord Ray, 868,'Yorke vs. Greenaugh;
2 Watts & Serg. 395, supra.
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of enforcing his claim.' There are also rights in Equity, equivalent
to liens, which exist only in Equity, and of which Equity only takes
cognizance.2  There must be however in fact, the same incidents,
except possession, necessary to constitute a lien at law.' In Admi-
ralty, an appreciation of the thing itself is, in general, the substra-
tum of the lien, either by service, by materials, or otherwise. Like
the lien in Equity, possession is not requisite.4 A Statute lien is,
of course, governed by the law which gives it.
The distinction between a lien at law and in Equity or Admi-
ralty, is well shown by examining the right of stoppage in transitu.
At common law, the vendor of goods not paid for and not delivered,
could retain them against the vendee, the payment of the price
being held a condition precedent.5 This was the vendor's lien.
But, as it often happened, that, after the vendor parted with the
goods, the vendee proved unable to pay for them, the Courts of
Equity held,6 that if the vendor could seize them in transitu, and
before they had actually come to the hands of the vendee, he (the
vendor) could reclaim them. This being a remedial proceeding, it
was adopted, and has been much favored by the Courts of law.7
But there is this material distinction. The vendor's lien continues
only so long as the goods are in his possession. The right of stop-
page in transitu begins after the possession has been parted with,
whilst the goods are in the hands of some middle man; and when
exercised, avails only to restore the original lien of the vendor.8
A lien, as we have seen, arises only by law, custom, or statute.
'2 Spence 796.- 2 2Uerivale 403; Gladstone vs. Birley, 4 Hare 193; 4 Comstock
169, Haverly vs. Becker.
3 The doctrine of equitable lien not adopted in Pennsylvania, 3 ]arr 72, Hepburn
vs. Snyder.
4 2 Story 143, Exparte John S. Foster; 2 Woodbury & Minot 48, The Sloop
Louisa.
6 6 East 27, note, Lickbarrow vs. Mason; 1 Harris 146, Bowen vs. Burk.
6 2 Vernon 203, Wiseman vs. Vanderprut. 2 Harris 48, Hays vs. Mouille.
7 Smith's Mere. Law 589, (Am. Ed.) 2 Harris 48, Hays vs. Mouille.
8 2 Kent 541, 16 Pickering 475, Stanton vs. Eager.
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When a lien is created by agreement, it becomes 1, a mortgage,
where the legal estate passes; or 2, a pawn or pledge, where merely
possession is given, a contract which obtains only as to personalty'
Of course, the agreement can enlarge, or limit, or otherwise modify
the lien at the will of the parties; but usually, a mortgage creates
an absolute estate in the land or chattel, subject to the equity of
redemption ;2 whilst a pawnee has but a special property in the
goods, to detain them for his security, and must restore them on
the payment of his debt.3  On the other hand, a mortgagee cannot,
in default of payment, sell without process of law; but a pawnee,
after notice, can.
4
Lien has been so often spoken of as preventing circuity of action,5
that it has been sometimes confounded with set-off. It may be
well therefore to notice the leading points of difference.
I Comyn's Dig. Mortgage A. Co. Litt. 205, a, Sall.. 522. Mr. Cross in his
treatise on the law of lien, p. 71, restricts the signification of Mortgage to
"the right acquired by the creditor upon the immovables which are appro-
priated to him by his debtor;" and cites -Domat lib. 3, fit. 1, sec. 1. But,
although, Domat says, (art. 1, cit. supra,) "le mot d'hypotheque signifie pro-
prement le droit acquis au cr.ancier sur les immeubles, &c.," yet he says it is a
distinction peculiar to France-" une difference importante entre notre usage et le
Droit Remain." The Roman law was, it would seem, like our own in the use of the
two words. In the Digest (L. 20 T. 1. De Pignoribus et Hlypothecis-2 Pothier's
4to. Ed. Pandects 238,) it is said-Pignus proprie rei mobilis constitui (GAIss.)
Et in hoc distant PJiqnus et Hypoteca; Proprie Pignus dicimus quod ad creditorem
transit; Ilypothecam, quum non transit, nec possessio ad creditorem. (Ulpian)
Quanquam etinm et Ilypotheca appellatur aliguando Pignus ; cure eamdem ac Pinus
creditori actionem tribuat. Hine MAncIAUS, Inter Pignus autem et Hypothecam,
tantum nominis sonus differt.
Mortgage of a chattel maybe made without deed; 11th Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 584,
Flory vs. Denny.
2 '1 Peters 441, Conard vs. Insurance Co. 1 Harris 406, Fluck vs. Replogle.
3 Comstock 443, 447, Wilson vs. Little. A transfer of the legal title, which
was necessary to effect the change of possession to certain shares of stock, and
made only for that purpose, held not to destroy the character of the transaction
as apledge, so as to convert it into a mortgage. See also Comyn, ut supra, Salk. 522,
623. 2 Harris 208, Houser vs. Kemp.
4 9 Mod. 278, Lockwood vs. Ewer, 1 P. Wins. 261. Tucker vs. Wilson.
5 2 Kent, 634.
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Set-off, unlike lien, was unknown to the common law. 1  "Natural
equity says, that cross demands shall compensate each other, by
deducting the less sum from the greater, and that the difference is
the only sum that can be justly due." 2  This principle was fully
recognized and enforced in the civil law, as compensation.
But however strong the "natural equity" of the right, the
English judges found no authority in the common law for ex-
tending its benefits to parties, and for that purpose various statutes
were required to be passed.3  In England, therefore, it is a purely
statutable right. In this State, it has been long known not only
by reason of the Defalcation Act of 1705,' but because our Courts
have adopted the doctrine of equitable set-off, and applied it to
common law proceedings. But even here, the non-existence of the
right at law has not been questioned. Again set-off is pleadable
only in actions ex contractu, 6 whilst lien is a good defence in
replevin, case, trespass, or other actions for tort.7
Whether when a lien and a right of set-off co-exist, the one may
be pleaded in answer to the other has been denied.8 But in
Gable v. Parry,9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, that
on a sci. fa. upon a mechanic's lien against owner and contractor,
the defendants may offer as a set-off, a debt due by the plaintiff
to the contractor. 10
15 S. & R. 121, Gogel vs. Jacoby. 2Lord Mansfield, 4 Burr. 22, 20, 1 B1. 65i,
Green vs. Farmer.
3 4 & 5 Anne c. 17-5 Geo. 1 c. 11.-2 Geo. 2 c. 22. 5 Geo. 2 c. 30. 8 Geo. 2 c.
24-6 Geo. 4 c. 16. 4fDulop, 45.
5 5 S. & R. 121, Gogel vs. Jacoby, 8 S. & R. 88, Waln's Assignees vs. Bank N. A.
64 S. & R. 257, Heck vs. Skinner.
7Lord Raymond, 4 Term 511, Japsford vs. Fletcher.
8Pinnock vs. Harrison, 3 Mee. & Welsby, 532.
91 Harris, 181.
30It is proposed to continue the discussion of this subject in future numbers.
